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Evaluating Ethiopia’s Development Progress
Abstract
Ethiopia, Africa’s second most-populated nation is well on its way to becoming one of its wealthiest nations as
it charges forward on its path to development. The big question is whether this growth is sustainable. To tackle
this question, we will discuss its development strategy using a popular comparison to that of China. We will
then offer an appraisal of the current state of the country. Finally, we will evaluate the future of Ethiopia, as it
continues its current path – evaluating the potential upsides and risks it faces moving forward.
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 EVALUATING ETHIOPIA’S DEVELOPMENT PROGRESS 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION: ETHIOPIA, THE LAST FRONTIER? 
 
‘We are the only African country that has never been colonized. This is perhaps the last 
surviving African civilization’ (Meles, 2007). Besides being commonly known as the only 
African country to never have been colonized, Ethiopia is also often regarded as ‘the birthplace 
of humanity’. Ethiopia is one of the most prominent African success stories in recent years. A 
country that is often associated with dire poverty and devastating famines has experienced 
sustained economic growth for the last 20 years, thereby alleviating the misery of millions of 
its own people, and now viewing itself in a prime position to become the last development 
frontier. Ethiopia was ruled by Emperor Haile Selassie until 1974, when he was toppled and 
replaced by the Derg, a military junta that imposed a USSR-style command economy, coupled 
with totalitarian rules. The Derg period was marked by very limited economic growth and 
repeated famines, most notably from 1983 to 1985, where it is estimated that around half a 
million people succumbed to starvation. At the same time, the Derg brutally suppressed 
political dissidents as well as the Eritrean independence movement. Since the very beginning 
of Derg rule, several Marxist groups rebelled against the new regime by taking up arms and 
engaging in guerilla warfare. Additionally, Addis Ababa was faced with an invasion by 
neighbouring Somalia, where irredentists sought to annex parts of Eastern Ethiopia that were 
inhabited primarily by ethnic Somalis. Only in 1991 was the oppressive Derg regime finally 
pushed out of power by a coalition of rebel groups, known as the Ethiopian People’s 
Revolutionary Democratic Front. This marked the beginning of Ethiopia’s economic 
transformation, which this paper will focus on. In the first section, we will discuss Ethiopia’s 
development strategy, and analyze the degree to which it is based on the Chinese model. In the 
second part, we will then offer an appraisal of the current state of the country, and evaluate the 
progress that has been made so far. Finally, there will be a discussion of the future path of 
development in Ethiopia, where we will examine the potential upsides and risks that the 
country faces. 
 
 
2. ETHIOPIA: DEVELOPMENT WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS? 
  
No country has more often been invoked as an analogy for Ethiopia in recent years than 
China, and not without reason (Capital Moments, 2017). If Rwanda is Africa’s Singapore, then 
Ethiopia is its China. The similarities are manifold. A strikingly poor country with an ancient 
civilization emerges from famine and internal turmoil, averaging double-digit growth rates for 
more than a decade while rejecting Western economic orthodoxy as well as political 
liberalization. Both countries are ruled by a single party and have opted for a state-led 
development (McKinnon, 2010). In this section, we will take look at Ethiopia’s development 
model, with a special focus on its contentious industrial policy. We will discuss the potential 
virtues and shortcomings of this model as well as its intellectual underpinnings. Subsequently, 
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 we will compare this to the development policies introduced by China and point to some 
essential differences between the two. 
  
2.1 ETHIOPIA’S INDUSTRIAL POLICY 
 
Generally associated more with perennial famines than stellar economic performance, 
Ethiopia has gone through an economic boom over the last decade. From 2005 to 2015, real 
GDP growth averaged almost 11% according to official government figures, transforming 
Ethiopia into the largest economy in Eastern Africa (CNBC Africa, 2016). Aided by significant 
foreign investment, the ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), 
commonly known as Ehadig, has embarked on an itinerary of concerted structural economic 
change. After having ousted the military Derg regime that had been in power since 1974, 
Ehadig started consolidating power while also implementing reforms to lay the groundwork for 
increased economic growth (Oqubay, 2015). Contrary to what orthodox development 
economics would recommend, Addis Ababa consciously rejected liberalization and a 
diminished role for the state. Most importantly, it executed an activist industrial policy. The 
term industrial policy can be interpreted rather broadly. Here, we will use the definition 
provided by Arkebe Oqubay, former mayor of Addis Ababa and senior policy maker in the 
Ethiopian government, whereby industrial policy denotes ‘[…] a strategy that includes a range 
of implicit or explicit policy instruments selectively focused on specific industrial sectors for 
the purpose of shaping structural change in line with a broader national vision and strategy’ 
(Oqubay, 2015, p.18). The mechanisms associated with such a design range from market 
control, strategic subsidization, protective tariffs, targeted quotas and ‘picking winners’, to the 
installation special economic zones and the protection of foreign investors (Stiglitz, 2014). In 
Ethiopia’s case, industrial policy has focused on agricultural development-led industrialization 
(ADLI), conducted through the implementation of five-year plans. The government plans to 
increase employment in the more productive sectors of the economy by promoting industrial 
development. At the same time, it aims to provide a more conducive environment for private 
actors by investing in public infrastructure projects, facilitating access to credit and 
maintaining macroeconomic stability, while also pursuing rather unorthodox measures in order 
to finance public investment. Addis Ababa also explicitly subscribes to the rationale of the 
infant industry argument (Oqubay, 2015). In essence, it aims to utilize tariff barriers to protect 
nascent industries until they have reached sufficient economies of scale, enabling them to 
compete with foreign companies (Sauré, 2007).  
 
 
2.2 BREAKING WITH THE PARADIGM 
 
These heterodox economic policies have not always found favor with Western observers 
and international institutions such as the IMF or the World Bank, which have generally 
endorsed the so-called ‘Washington Consensus’ [1]. This package of policy prescriptions, 
which emerged in the 1980s and was being championed not only by the above-mentioned 
institutions but also by the US government, as well as advocates for market-based reforms, 
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 financial liberalization, and cautions against state-led intervention. This is based on the belief 
that excessive government interference will lead to economic distortions with negative effects 
on resource allocation, exacerbated rent-seeking and generally sub-optimal economic outcomes 
(McKinnon, 2010). Additionally, undue government activity can often lead to the crowding-
out of the private sector. In Ethiopia’s case, this is specifically worrisome as it pertains to the 
access to credit and other refinancing options, both of which are heavily dominated by the state 
(World Bank, 2016).  
 
2.3 NEOPATRIMONIALISM AS AN IMPEDIMENT? 
 
Another criticism leveled at African activist industrial policy stems from those who 
underline the pervasiveness of ‘neopatrimonialism’ in the societies of sub-Saharan Africa 
(Erdmann 2006). Neopatrimonialism denotes a system of social hierarchy that, while often co-
existing with legal-rational bureaucracies, is essentially based on patrimonial-clientage 
relationships, where loyalty hinges on the redistribution of favors and material incentives by 
those in power to the clientele (Van de Walle, 1999; Orogun, 1991). This essentially implies 
that the many failures of industrial policy in Africa were essentially of political rather than 
economic nature, signifying the state’s lack of fundamental capabilities and/or will to 
implement sound policies. Institutional weakness and rampant and endemic corruption, both of 
which are prevalent in African societies, supposedly exacerbate rent-seeking and inefficiencies, 
whereby the ruler’s personal clientele or favored ethnic/religious group benefit excessively 
from government intervention in the economy (Oqubay, 2015).  
Ethiopian policymakers openly reject these admonitions, as well as free trade and economic 
liberalism. One foreign observer recalls how he was told in Addis Ababa that Ethiopia would 
‘prefer to be dragged over burning coals’ over turning towards the IMF for assistance 
(Robertson, 2016). This repudiation of the ‘Washington Consensus’ is a very conscious 
decision, and Ethiopian officials have repeatedly praised China’s development path as a role 
model, which suggests acceptance of a however vaguely defined ‘Beijing Consensus’. In line 
with the supposed ‘China model’, many Asian observers point to the advantages of Ethiopia’s 
political stability and its ability to eschew cumbersome political compromises when it comes to 
implementing economic reforms (Oqubay, 2015).  
 
2.4 NO MERE COPY: PRAGMATISM PREVAILS? 
 
Nonetheless, despite all the similarities between Ethiopia’s development strategy and that of 
China or the East Asian Tigers, there are also crucial differences. Agriculture plays a more 
prominent role in the Ethiopian economy in comparison to the minor part of manufacturing, 
which only accounts for a minor part of the Ethiopian economy with an employment share of 
around 10% (World Bank, 2016). Furthermore, Ethiopia has significantly lower domestic 
saving rates than the Tigers or China had at similar stages of development, which makes 
investment financing more challenging. Particularly in contrast to the Chinese Renminbi, the 
Ethiopian Birr has been kept at artificially high levels in order to facilitate capital imports. 
Officials in Addis Ababa have pointed out that currency depreciation would not serve their 
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 immediate policy goals, especially as export-oriented manufacturing is still in its infant stages 
(World Bank).  
  
In this section, we have examined the Ethiopian development model from a theoretical 
perspective. It is based on an activist industrial policy, executed through specific and wide-
ranging governmental interventions in the economy and fueled by massive public investment. 
Ethiopian policy makers are conscious of the need for structural change in order to facilitate 
sustainable economic growth. Furthermore, we have demonstrated the rejection of orthodox 
advice concerning the liberalization of the economy, in favor what has been termed the 
‘Beijing Consensus’ on development. Nevertheless, the Ethiopian growth model is not simply 
an imitation of the Chinese experience, as Addis Ababa has pragmatically opted to utilize only 
those aspects that are suitable to Ethiopia’s specific conditions. 
 
3. THE CURRENT STATE OF ETHIOPIA’S DEVELOPMENT 
  
Ethiopia has, over the years, undergone massive development following the introduction of 
their precise plans. The gravity of this progression is visible according to several development 
indicators. These include financial, health, education, and specific sectoral indicators. 
  
3.1 ETHIOPIA’S FINANCIAL BOOM 
 
GDP per capita, one of the most commonly used development indicators, measures 
economic development according to the pace of income growth per head of the population 
(United Nations, n.d.). According to its current trend in GDP per capita growth, Ethiopia is 
positioned to be developing at a very successful rate. More specifically, there have been two 
peak periods of growth during recent Ethiopian history – 1993-2004, when the growth rate was 
4.5%, and 2004 -2014, when it soared to 10.9%. These figures are remarkable considering the 
fact that during the bulk of the 1980s, the growth rate was at a measly 0.5% (see annex A1). 
The year 1992 marked the shift from a command economy to a more market-oriented economy 
associated with the demise of the socialist Derg regime (1974–1991). In addition, the period 
since 1992 was preceded by political regime change and the end of a major civil war. Growth 
was higher during this first period in the 90s, but somewhat unstable. 2004, in turn, marked the 
first year of an unprecedented sustained high-growth period (World Bank, 2016). Both shifts 
suggest very promising movements for the Ethiopian economy. 
 
3.2 EDUCATION IN ETHIOPIA: A PRIORITY 
 
As a primary component of its push towards becoming a middle-income country, education 
has been placed as a point of focus by the Ethiopian government. In 1994, Ethiopia announced 
the passing of the Education and Training Policy (ETP) reform, which was the first formal 
framework for education in Ethiopia (International Development Center of Japan, 2012). Its 
objectives were to provide a more comprehensive education for its students both in primary 
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 and secondary education, as wells as in terms of training (Ministry of Education, 1994). In 
2010/11, the gross enrollment rate (GER) was 96.4% in primary education. The net enrollment 
rate (NER) marked 85.3% in 2010/11, the highest ever and showing a significant improvement 
from 52.2% in 2001/02 (see annex A2). However, Ethiopia’s focus has been not only on access 
to education, but also on concurrent improvements in the quality of education together with the 
increasing population growth- ensuring that more of their students pass and a more equal 
system of education (UNESCO, 2015). As it currently stands, compared to other countries, 
Ethiopia ranks at the 7th percentiles in access to education and at the 8th percentiles in learning 
outcomes (EPDC, 2014) (see annex A3). However, its increased per pupil expenditure rate 
suggests that Ethiopia will make a big leap in the educational sector (see annex A4). 
 
3.3 DERIVING DEVELOPMENT FROM HEALTH 
 
In order to have a progressive economy, one must have a stable healthy population. It is 
therefore imperative that Ethiopia show improvements in the health sector to ever be 
considered as successfully developing. As it stands, Ethiopia is characterized by a 
predominantly rural and impoverished population with limited access to safe water, housing, 
sanitation, food and health care. Estimated life expectancy at birth is 63 years for males and 67 
years for females (World Bank, 2016). The burden of disease measured in terms of premature 
death is estimated at 350 disability-adjusted life years lost per 1000 members of the population, 
which is the highest in sub-Saharan Africa. In addition to the widespread poverty and low-
income level of the population, a low literacy rate (mainly among women) and lack of access 
to health care have contributed to ill health in the country. The infant mortality rate is 41 deaths 
per 1000 live births, while the overall under-five mortality rate is 58.4 per 1000 live births (see 
Annex A5_1 and A5_2). A total of 67% of all deaths of children aged under five years in 
Ethiopia take place before a child’s first birthday. However, these levels are considerably lower 
than those reported in the Ethiopian demographic and health survey in 2005. Both the infant 
mortality rate and the under-five mortality rate have decreased significantly (World Health 
Organization, 2014). Ethiopia remains one of the poorest in terms of health conditions, but its 
improvements show promise of development. 
  
3.4 SECTORAL DEVELOPMENT IN ETHIOPIA 
 
Development is also capable of being felt directly in specific sectors. In Ethiopia, most 
notably, the Services and Agricultural Sector have been the most promising. The Services 
sector was the largest in terms of economic output, accounting for 45% of the value added in 
the Ethiopian Economy in 2013 (see Annex A6). It has also been one of the largest sectors in 
terms of employment, accounting for the employment of 15% of the total population of 
Ethiopia in 2013(see Annex A7). The global pattern has changed over time as services are now 
creating more jobs and manufacturing less, a sign of premature deindustrialization. Ethiopia is 
consistent with this trend apart from manufacturing output, which remained quite small 
unfortunately. The agricultural sector is the second biggest in terms of economic output and by 
far the biggest employer, with the number of farmers growing at a rate of 3.4% (World Bank, 
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 2016). With continuous expansion in terms of cultivated area (land) and farmers (labor), one 
could make the argument that the agricultural sector should be the focus of development policy 
in Ethiopia. 
 
 
4. CONTINUOUS GROWTH?  
ASSESSING THE POTENTIAL AND RISKS OF AN EMERGING ECONOMY 
 
Expectations are high for Ethiopia to follow the footsteps of the Asian tigers, which is to 
guarantee continuous economic growth by building an increasingly important manufacturing 
sector. The economic successes of previous years seem to proof support country’s potential to 
reach this goal in the coming decades, yet there are certain risks that have the potential to 
undermine this success story. The following sections analyse the future expectations and risks 
for the Ethiopian economy. 
 
4.1 FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE - POSSIBILITIES FOR 
CONTINUOUS GROWTH 
 
Continuous industrialization is one of the cornerstones for the future economic success of 
Ethiopia. Building on manufacturing as a driver for growth, Ethiopia has increasingly attracted 
investors for its manufacturing facilities. These investors recognize Ethiopia as a prime 
investment destination not solely based on its encouraging expected growth rates, but due to 
other positive factors as well such as low production costs and stability (Aglionby, 2017). First, 
the costs for energy and labor in Ethiopia are multiple times lower than in the manufacturing 
economies in Asia, and therefore this gives the Ethiopian market a comparative advantage in 
the producing industrial sector for the foreseeable future. Second, as compared to other African 
countries that would boast a similar economic structure and would - in terms of low cost - be 
attractive to foreign investors, Ethiopia is a politically stable country. For the last two decades, 
there have been no major regime changes, and this stability is reflected in the increasing 
attractiveness of Ethiopia for foreign investors. If these conditions - low production costs 
relative to other manufacturing nations and political stability - can be upheld, capital inflow 
into, and thus the development of, the Ethiopian manufacturing sector is likely to continue. 
Next to its preferential situation as a low cost producing country, Ethiopia has other 
strengths that can be further exploited in the future. Being the second largest country in terms 
of population on the African continent, Ethiopia has great potential as a market and thus 
expansion of international firms into the Ethiopian market is highly likely. To exploit this 
potential, however, Ethiopia must further expand its effort to effect structural change. There 
are many fields open to further development as a substantial part of Ethiopia’s work force that 
is still employed in the small structured agricultural sector (World Bank, 2016, p. 39). As 
McMillan and Rodrik (2011) put it, “[a]s labor and other resources move from agriculture into 
modern economic activities, overall productivity rises and incomes expand. The speed with 
which this structural transformation takes place is the key factor that differentiates successful 
countries from unsuccessful ones” (p. 1). Thus, focusing on the modernization and 
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 commercialization of the agricultural sector and restructuring the economy as a whole - a shift 
from primary to the secondary and tertiary sector - offers great potential for further economic 
development. 
 
4.2 FROM CLIMATE CHANGE TO POLITICAL INSTABILITY - RISKS FOR ETHIOPIA’S GROWING 
ECONOMY 
 
Yet, while structural change opens up doors for future development, if such a 
transformation is not effectuated in a timely manner, there are major risks for Ethiopia’s 
economy. Moreover, besides structural change, Ethiopia runs the risk to be overtaken by 
technological development in other parts of the world, rendering its growth strategy obsolete. 
An economy strongly based on agriculture remains vulnerable to commodity price volatility as 
well as ecological degradation. Through this dependency on agricultural production, 
exogenous factors such as lack of rainfall and price volatility have significant effects on the 
purchasing power of Ethiopian households and therefore on the growth potential of the 
economy itself (Hill and Porter, 2016). This problematic situation is further exacerbated by the 
risks of climate change, as Yalew et al. (2017) concluded, “the regional effects of climate 
change primarily depend on the share of agriculture in the regions’ (sic!) GDP” (p. 21). While 
this evidence shows the risk of not achieving timely structural change, even if such change is 
effectuated, a simple shift from agricultural to manufacturing might not get the job of sustained 
economic development done. The reason for such a risk is increasing automation. Ethiopia 
might simply be too late when copying the strategy of the Asian tigers to shift its focus to 
manufacturing, as technology currently takes large leaps to replace workers, for example, in 
the clothing production sector. As wages are rising in the production sectors of East-Asian 
countries, other economies – such as Ethiopia – which aim to fill the void might be overtaken 
by robots (Nicolaou and Stacey, 2017).  
As mentioned above, Ethiopia’s popularity with foreign investors can be in part explained 
by its relative political stability as compared to other low-cost African countries. Such a 
continuous stability must be maintained to secure sustained economic growth. In turn, an 
unstable political situation threatens continued economic success in Ethiopia. During eleven 
months of upheaval in the Oromia region, the government introduced a state of emergency in 
order to crack down on the protest in October 2016. These upheavals were spurred by political 
and economic grievances, as the country is controlled by one single party and the economic 
growth does not arrive in all regions equally. Little is done by the government to address these 
issues and thereby treat the disease; instead, it is just suppressing the symptoms by employing 
coercive force (Aglionby, 2017). Besides internal political challenges, instability in Ethiopia’s 
neighbourhood can impede sustained growth. With neighboring countries that are politically 
unstable, to say the least, such as Somalia and South Sudan, as well as continued political 
tensions with Eritrea, Ethiopia has to watch out and anticipate cross border challenges before 
they arrive to secure a stable environment for investment (Coface, 2017). In short, Ethiopia 
faces political risks that could undermine its attractiveness to foreign investors in the future, 
and these risks are equally to be found within the borders of the country, as well as in the 
general instability of the region. 
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 All in all, Ethiopia possesses strengths that indicate a continuation of its success story and 
the possibility to strengthen its status as emerging country in East Africa. Growing interest of 
foreign investors, low production costs – and thus comparative advantage – as well as the 
structural potential for economic growth, underpin this possibility. Yet, there are a number of 
economic and political risks that might undermine such a development. Ecological 
degradation, climate change, and commodity price volatility can seriously harm the economy 
that is still to a large degree based on agricultural production. Moreover, copying the 
development model of the “Asian Tigers” – thus focusing on manufacturing – could prove as 
becoming obsolete as automation in the manufacturing sector plays an increasingly important 
role. Internal and external political questions are yet other factors that will co-determine the 
success or failure of the Ethiopian way. In short, Ethiopia shows potential to achieve perpetual 
economic success, yet it will have to overcome a number of obstacles on the path. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
Ethiopia has had the highest rate of economic growth of any large African country over the 
last decade, resulting in large-scale poverty reduction and renewed dynamism. It has 
implemented a state-led development model that broadly builds upon the example set by 
China, but from which it also differs in several crucial regards. More generally, Ethiopian 
policymakers have largely rejected orthodox development models in favour of an activist 
industrial policy and heterodox financing arrangements. The success of this development 
model seems staggering at first sight, as advances have been made not only in purely financial 
term but also across the board in human development more broadly. This is clearly indicated 
by the growing number of children who receive basic education, as well as by the remarkable 
improvements witnessed in the health sector. Developments such as growing popularity with 
foreign investors and comparative advantage in manufacturing due to low production costs 
suggest that the success story of the last years and decades can continue well into the future. 
On the other hand, Ethiopia’s development also faces significant obstacles and potential risks 
that should not be underestimated, and which include not only natural degradation and price 
volatility, but also political instability. 
To put this discussion into perspective, though, it must not be forgotten that the starting 
point for development in Ethiopia remains strikingly low. Being a country with nearly 100 
million inhabitants, its total GDP is only equal to that of the city of Zurich, which has a 
population of little more than 400’000 inhabitants. Even more illustrative is a comparison with 
China, which is often regarded as Ethiopia’s ‘development role model’. Some 30 years ago, the 
level of development in the two countries was roughly the same, yet today the GDP per capita 
in Ethiopia is only a little more than a tenth of that in China (IMF, 2017). Thus, the path to 
catching up is a long one. Notwithstanding all the anticipated difficulties, Ethiopia’s success 
over the last years is remarkable, and if it continues to hold up its run, ‘emerging country’ is a 
term that can be assigned to the economy. On a final note, seeing Ethiopia’s growth during the 
last decade, a legitimate question can be asked whether other African countries can and should 
follow its footsteps and adopt its specific development model. This question opens up to a 
broader topic of study to the extent to which such heterodox economic policy can prove useful 
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 in an African-wide context, and whether the current paradigms of economic development 
should be revisited.  
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 ANNEX 
 
 
ANNEX A1: ETHIOPIA: REAL GDP GROWTH  
 
Source: World Bank (2016), Used with permission 
 
 
 
ANNEX A2: PRIMARY GROSS AND NET ENROLLMENT RATES (2001/02 -2010/11) (%) 
 
 
Source: International Development Center of Japan, Inc. (2012). 
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Table 4-4: Primary Gross and Net Enrollment Rates (2001/02 - 2010/11) (%) 
 
  
2001/
02 
2002/
03 
2003/
04 
2004/
05 
2005/
06 
2006/
07 
2007/
08 
2008/
09 
2009/
10 
2010/
11 
GER Primary 
Grades 
1-4 
Boys 96.2 94.6 95.2 109.8 123.9 122.9 133.0 126.7  123.2  128.8 
Girls 73.3 73.5 78.3 95.5 111.2 111.2 122.5 118.4  114.3  119.1 
Total 84.9 84.2 86.9 102.7 117.6 117.1 127.8 122.6  118.8  124.0 
Primary 
Grades 
5-8  
Boys 45.4 52.5 57.0 62.0 67.4 68.3 64.8 65.6  67.4  67.4 
Girls 27.4 31.9 36.9 42.6 49.8 53.7 55.5 60.5  63.5  64.8 
Total 36.5 42.4 47.1 52.5 58.8 61.1 60.2 63.1  65.5  66.1 
Primary 
Grades 
1-8  
Boys 71.7 74.6 77.4 88.0 98.6 98.0 100.5 97.6  96.6  99.5 
Girls 51.2 53.8 59.1 71.5 83.9 85.1 90.5 90.7  90.1  93.2 
Total 61.6 64.4 68.4 79.8 91.3 91.7 95.6 94.4  93.4  96.4 
NER Primary 
Grades 
1-8 
Boys 59.0 60.6 62.9 73.2 81.7 82.6 86.0 84.6  83.7  87.0 
Girls 45.2 47.2 51.8 63.6 73.2 75.5 80.7 81.3  80.5  83.5 
Total 52.2 54.0 57.4 68.5 77.5 79.1 83.4 83.0  82.1  85.3 
(Source: 2000/01-2004/05: MOE, 2005, 2005/06-2009/10: MOE, 2010c, 2010/11: MOE, 2011a) 
 
4.1.4 Enrollment Trend of Secondary Education 
As the target of the series of ESDPs has been set to achieve the UPE by 2015, policies and 
financial investment focused preferentially on primary education. As a result, primary education 
was significantly expanded (WB, 2008a). This has occurred also at the secondary level (WB, 
2008a). However, gender disparities and disparities between urban and rural areas have become 
a challenge, especially in the secondary level (Cambridge Education, Mokoro & OPM, 2010). 
In addition, though the enrollment rate of general secondary education has improved 
significantly, the enrollment of preparatory secondary education has still remained low (WB, 
2008a). 
As shown in Table 4-5, the GER of general secondary schools has increased during the past 10 
years, and reached 38.4% in 2010/11. The GER of preparatory secondary has also increased. 
The NER13 has also continued to increase, but slightly decreased in 2010/11 to 16.3% (MOE, 
2005, 2010c, 2011). 
Table 4-5: Secondary Gross and Net Enrollment Rates (2001/02 - 2010/11) (%) 
 
  
2001
/02 
2002
/03 
2003
/04 
2004
/05 
2005
/06 
2006
/07 
2007
/08 
2008
/09 
2009
/10 
2010
/11 
GER 
Secondary 
1
st
 cycle 
Boys 20.4 24.0 28.2 34.6 41.6 45.7 44.4 43.7  43.5  41.8 
Girls 13.7 14.3 15.9 19.8 24.5 28.6 29.6 32.4  34.7  34.9 
Total 17.1 19.3 22.1 27.3 33.2 37.3 37.1 38.1  39.1  38.4 
Secondary 
2nd cycle 
Boys n/a n/a n/a n/a 5.7 7.3 7.8 8.5 8.9 9.4 
Girls n/a n/a n/a n/a 2.0 3.7 3.8 3.5 5.0 6.7 
Total n/a n/a n/a n/a 3.9 5.5 5.8 6.0 7.0 8.1 
NER 
Secondary 
(total) 
Boys 8.6 10.1 12.0 14.2 15.5 16.8 15.4 15.0  16.8  16.4 
Girls 6.2 6.7 7.5 9.3 10.7 12.6 12.2 11.9  16.1  16.2 
Total 7.4 8.4 9.8 11.8 13.2 14.7 13.8 13.5  16.4  16.3 
(Source: 2000/01-2004/05: MOE, 2005, 2005/06-2009/10: MOE, 2010c, 2010/11: MOE, 2011a) 
                                                
13 The breakdown of secondary 1st cycle and 2nd cycle was not available. 
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 ANNEX A3: COMPARISON OF ACCESS AND LITERACY 
 
Source: Education Policy and Data Center (2014) 
 
 
ANNEX A4: PER PUPIL EXPENDITURE (PPE) BY SCHOOL LEVEL (% OF GDP PER CAPITA) 
 
 
Source: Education Policy and Data Center (2014) 
 
 
 
  
Figures 6 and 7 look at indicators of participation, completion, and progression in the education system. Figure 6 displays gross indicators (which include under- and over-age students) and net indicators 
(which include only on-time students of official school age) for student intake, participation, and flows. In Ethiopia, the gross enrollment rate in primary education is 87% for both girls and boys 
combined. This decreases to 38% in lower secondary, with a student transition rate to secondary school of 93%. In Ethiopia, the primary net enrollment rate is 68% and the primary completion rate is 
47%. Both of these indicators provide a sense of the progress a country is making towards universal primary education -- a key UN Millenium Development Goal -- and, for Ethiopia, suggest that the 
country has yet to achieve universal primary education. Figure 7 displays the repetition rate in primary education, showing the specific grades in which students are more likely to repeat. It suggests that 
in Ethiopia, students are more likely to repeat grade 5 in primary education. The repetition rate in grade 5 is 10.6% (for both males and females), which is 1.7 points higher than the average repetition 
rate across primary grades of 9.0%.
LEARNING
This section provides information on indicators of learning, which lend insight into the 
quality of educational provision. In this profile, learning is measured through literacy 
rates, which are important because literacy is a foundational skill needed to attain 
higher levels of learning, and national performance on learning assessments. Figure 8 
demonstrates where Ethiopia stands in comparison to other low and middle income 
countries in access to education, measured as the primary school net enrollment rate, 
and youth literacy. Compared to other countries, Ethiopia ranks at the 7 percentile in 
access and at the 8 percentile in learning. Figure 9 compares youth and adult literacy 
rates and shows that, in Ethiopia, the literacy rate is 55%  among the youth population; 
this is lower than the average youth literacy rate in other low income countries. 
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FIG 6. STUDENT INTAKE AND FLOW FROM PRIMARY TO SECONDARY SCHOOLS
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 ANNEX A5_1:  INFANT MORTALITY RATE 
 
 
Source: Retrieved from https://datacatalog.worldbank.org 
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 ANNEX A5_2:  UNDER 5 MORTALITY RATE 
 
 
 
Source: Retrieved from https://datacatalog.worldbank.org 
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 ANNEX A6:  VALUE ADDED IN THE ETHIOPIAN ECONOMY 
 
 
Source: World Bank (2016), Used with permission 
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 ANNEX A7: EMPLOYMENT IN ETHIOPIAN ECONOMY 
 
 
 
Source: World Bank (2016), Used with permission 
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